Changelog

Added

• Chip reads are checked against government certificate lists. Each issuing country’s certificate authority (CSCA) comes from lists published by the German (BSI), Dutch and Italian governments, verified against each publisher’s own key before use. 138 countries are covered, including Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. A chip from a covered country whose data and signature check out reaches nfcStatus: verified and can earn the chip assurance level. A chip from a country not on the list reads inconclusive and the verification falls back to the document and the government database.
• Cancelled signers. Countries’ cancellation lists are checked, and a chip whose signing certificate its country has cancelled is never treated as genuine (nfc.sod.signerRevoked: true, the chip reads inconclusive). A signer retired in the ordinary way (replaced, or the office closed) keeps the passports it already signed valid.
• Decision field verification.nfcSignerCancellationUnknown (“Passport signer’s cancellation status unknown”): true when a chip is genuine but its country’s cancellation list was unavailable or out of date, so we could not check whether the signer was cancelled. These chips are accepted by default; add a rule on the NFC step’s Rules tab to review or decline them.
• nfc.cloneCheck and decision field verification.nfcCloneCheck: how a copied chip was ruled out (active_auth, face_bound or none).
• nfc.activeAuth.reason gains dg15_withheld (the chip’s key was left out of the submission) and signature_malformed (the chip’s answer could not be read). Neither fails a verification.

An additive release for Risk Intelligence, Monitoring, Screening, Alerts, Cases and Transaction Monitoring.